Chapter I
Endnotes
1 For detailed account of major operations, see Vol. I of this series.
2 At the time of his arrival in Australia in March 1942, General MacArthur found approximately 25,000 American troops, mostly of service classifications, scattered from Western Australia to New Caledonia, a thousand miles east of the Australian mainland.
3 Initially, the Australian 6th Division, less two brigades, and the 7th Division. Both served in the Middle East.
4 GHQ USAFPAC, Opns Instns No. 4, Annex 3, " Troop Lists," 15 Aug 45 (S).
5 Operation "Downfall" was the over-all plan for the final conquest of Japan; "Olympic" was the first sub-division thereof, "Coronet" the second. (1) Rad CX-17032, CINCAFPAC to CINCPOA, 26 May 45. In CofS, GHQ 640 (Navy); (2) Conf of the CinC, USAFPAC and CINCPAC, Held at Manila, P I on 16 May 45. In CofS GHQ 653 (Navy).
6 In recommending courses of action to the War Department as early as April 1945, the CinC had noted that there would be an anticipated deficiency of some 36,000 hospital beds, even counting everything then available in the Pacific, should "Olympic" and "Coronet" be adopted. (Rad (TS) C-14442, CINCAFPAC to WARCOS, 20 Apr 45. In AFPAC 982.)
7 Toward the end of the war the Japanese were paying some attention to propaganda leaflets as well as "safe conduct" leaflets issued by FELO, the propaganda agency originally associated with Allied Intelligence Bureau (Vol. V, Int Ser, GHQ, FEC, Operations of the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (R), Doc. App. VII. See also Vol. IV, Int Ser, GHQ, FEC, Operations of the Allied Intelligence Bureau (R), Sum of AIB Activ, p. 115.) In addition, between thirteen and fifteen hundred Japanese surrendered en masse July 1945 to the 93d US Division at Morotai when brought into that base by a US Navy escort which had intercepted the Japanese hospital ship Tishibana Maru actually loaded with troops and contraband instead of patients.
8 Rad C-15431, CINCAFPAC to AGWAR, 4 May 45. In G-3 GHQ Adm 381/61. GHQ was aware in top secret intelligence channels of current Japanese peace feelers through its embassy in Russia.
9 (1) Later revised. See GHQ USAFPAC, Basic Outline Plan for "Blacklist" Opns (2d ed), 25 Jul 45 (TS); (2) CINCPOA Memo for Record, 23 Jul 45 (TS). In G-3 GHQ Adm 380/6-3 P.
10 (1) GHQ USAFPAC, Basic Outline Plan for "Blacklist" Opns (2d ed), 25 Jul 45 (TS); (2) Rad C-25892 CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC, 16 Jul 45. In GHQ Adm 381/61; (3) Rad C-28793, CINCAFPAC to WARCOS. 27 Jul 45. In CofS GHQ WD 1088.
11 Rad WX-17064/14, JCS to CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC, 14 Jun 45.
12 (1) CINCPAC to CINCPOA, Joint Staff Study "Campus," 9 Aug 45; (2) Rads C-29035 and C-28810, CINCAFPAC to WARCOS, 27 Jul 45.
13 GHQ USAFPAC, Basic Outline Plan for "Blacklist" Opns (3d ed), 8 Aug 45 (TS), p. 4.
14 GHQ USAFPAC, Opns Instns No. 4, Annex 4, Essential Elms of Enemy Info, 15 Aug 45 (S).
15 GHQ USAFPAC, Basic Outline Plan for " Blacklist " Opns (3d ed), 8 Aug 45 (TS), p.8.
(From GHQ SCAP Daily Sit Rpt No. 15, 12 Sep 45.)
18 GHQ USAFPAC, Basic Outline Plan for " Blacklist " Opns (2d ed), 25 Jul 45 (TS).
19 The decision to effect extensive landings by the 11th A/B Division was in consequence of General MacArthur's conviction that any show of naval landing strength should be accompanied by similar army forces which eventually would be better prepared and serviced to constitute a permanent occupying force. (Rad C-30508, CINCAFPAC to WARCOS, 3 Aug 45. In CofS GHQ WD 1099 .)
20 GHQ USAFPAC, Basic Outline Plan for " Blacklist " Opns (3d ed), 8 Aug 45 (TS), pp. 10-11.
21 Occupation mission subsequently assigned to XXIV Corps.
22 The proposed occupation of southern Sakhalin (Karafuto) was purely speculative since high-level negotiations turning over Sakhalin and the Kuriles to the Soviets were not at that time known to theater commanders. This was one of the famous Yalta concessions.
24 GHQ USAFPAC, Basic Outline Plan for " Blacklist " Opns (3d ed), 8 Aug 45 (TS), p. 8.
26 Operations Instructions No. 4 included specific detailed instructions which envisioned a comprehensive picture of conditions to be found and methods of dealing therewith.
27 Actually, upon entry of US Public Health and Welfare units, it was found to the astonishment of the commanders of these units that there existed no public health plan for Japan; responsibility appeared to be a matter of desultory community interest and action.
28 GHQ USAFPAC, Basic Outline Plan for " Blacklist " Opns (3d ed), 8 Aug 45 (TS), App. IV, Annex 5b, Enforcement of Surrender Terms.
29 For details of these historic days, see SWPA Set, Vol. I, The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific.
30 The final editions of "Blacklist" plan were dated 8 August 1945. The perfected and expanded plan was the product of a war-hardened, cohesive General Staff at the zenith of its efficiency. This would be no haphazard occupation, no "trial and error effort." The Commander in Chief's determination that history would regard the Occupation as an enlightened military effort by a Christian nation to assist rather than destroy a fallen foe, yet do so with firmness, efficiency and dispatch was reflected in the wealth of the directive planning outlined in the various annexes of "Blacklist." Foresight based on critical military studies and research into the customs and reactions of the Japanese was evident in the detailed measures to be taken by all commands in regard to counterintelligence, communications, engineering projects, military government, enforcement of surrender terms, control, disarmament and demobilization of the Japanese armed forces, and care and evacuation of Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees.
31 Rad (TS)WX-49042, WARCOS to CINCAFPAC, 14 Aug 45. In CofS GHQ AFPAC WD 1122 (TS).
33 Rad Z-501, SCAP to Japanese Emperor, IJG, and IJ GHQ, 15 Aug 45.
34 GHQ SCAP & USAFPAC, Mo Sum of Opns, Aug 45 (S).
36 GHQ USAFPAC, Opns Instns No. 4, 15 Aug 45 (S).
37 GHQ USAFPAC, Opns Instns No. 4, 15 Aug 45 (S), Annex No. 3, Tentative Troop List, Recapitulation, p. 61.
40 Known as " USASCOM-O " and " USASCOM-C " respectively.
41 The complexity and magnitude of the supply problem was fully appreciated by GHQ. The Logistics Annex of the operations instructions creating USASCOM-O and USASCOM-C stated: "Because of the short time available for purposes of planning and organization logistically, these operations must be accomplished on the basis of availability of troops, materials, supplies, and transportation, rather than fulfilling planned requirements. Service troops are made available to commanders based on their availability at appropriate locations, and materials and supplies designed for support of troops in rear areas and loaded on ships to meet these requirements will be diverted to the occupied areas. As a result, supplies and materials arriving in occupied areas will not be those which would ordinarily be shipped to meet requirements for support of troops and for construction of specific facilities. It will therefore be necessary that commanders take advantage of all existing facilities found in occupied areas and accommodate construction of additional essential facilities to that which can be accomplished with materials located in the areas and those received in diverted shipping. Supplies as received will be unbalanced. Measures will be taken by this headquarters to obtain balanced stockages of supplies in occupied areas at the earliest practicable date. Service troops excess in one category will be employed to meet shortages in other categories. The maximum practicable number of service troops should arrive in the objective areas during the early phases of the Occupation, in order to better meet the needs of combat troops arriving later.
"Troops to be employed in this operation will be mounted with equipment and accompanying supplies which can immediately be made available to them upon announcement of ' B' Day. Commanders responsible for provision of equipment and accompanying supplies will take all possible measures to completely equip in advance all troops designated for these operations and to have available in the vicinity of staging areas accompanying supplies in quantities as indicated...."
42 Alternate plan for " Baker 20."
44 Allied Hq, SWPA, Opns Instns No. 97,22 Aug 45.
45 GHQ USAFPAC, Opns Instns No. 4,15 Aug 45 (S).
46 GHQ SCAP & USAFPAC, Mo Sum of Opns, Sep 45 (S).
50 This mission was lead by Lt Gen T. Kawabe, who had become Vice Chief of the General Staff in April. There were fifteen other members. They were met at Nichols Field by Maj Gen Charles A. Willoughby, ACofS, G-2, acting for SCAP, and Col Sydney F. Mashbir of Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, one of G-2's important subsidiary organizations which was to play a vital part in the conferences. For a complete report of these events see Vol. 1, this series.
51 General title was: "Requirements of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Presented to the Japanese Representatives at Manila, P. I., 19 Aug 45 ". The specific titles of the documents were (1) "Orientation, Agenda, and Requirements", (2) "Requirements for Entry and Operations of an Advance Party Representing the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers within the Tokyo Bay Area," (3) "Requirements for the Entry of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and His Accompanying Forces," and (4) "Requirements for Entry and Operations of Initial Occupation Forces in Kanoya Area of Southern Kyushu".
52 GHQ SCAP, Requirements of SCAP presented to the Japanese Representatives at Manila, P I, 19 Aug 45, Sec. II, "Requirements for Entry and Opns of an Adv Party Representing SCAP within the Tokyo Bay Area."
53 Ibid, Sec. III, "Requirements for the Entry of SCAP and His Accompanying Forces."
54 Ibid., Sec. IV, "Requirements for the Entry and Opns of Initial Occupation Forces in the Kanoya Area of Southern Kyushu."
55 Rad (S) 15 & 16, IJG to SCAP, 21 Aug 45.
56 Higashi Kuni, My Memoirs (Tohoshobo, 1947).
59 Tokyo, Yomiuri-Hochi, 18 Aug 45.
63 GHQ SCAP& USAFPAC, Mo Sum of Opns, Sep 45 (S).
65 Maj Gen Seizo Arisue, in charge of the preparation of Atsugi airfield, reported in his unpublished Memoirs of Atsugi " that for " some strange reason " this aircraft and the following ones came in downwind despite the fact that the Japanese had painstakingly erected an air sock for their guidance. The Americans probably preferred to take their chances with a slightly unfavorable wind than to nose helplessly into some prepared Japanese armoured trap.
66 Col Tench was followed by his immediate staff comprising Capt C. B. Jones, USN, Col E. K. Warburton, 5th AF, Cols C. R. Hutchinson and D. M. Dunne, CE, Cols S. S. Auchincloss and L. Park, SigC, and Maj F. Bowers, ATIS interpreter.
67 Tokyo, Asahi Shimbun, 29, 31 Aug 45; Mainichi Shimbun, 29 Aug 45.
68 GHQ USAFPAC, Opns Instns No. 4, 15 Aug 45 (S), Amendment No. 12, Doc. App. IV. This type of military government is known as "passive" as contrasted to the "active" type introduced in Germany.
69 G-2, GHQ, was charged with the development and surveillance of plans for the demobilization and disarmament of the Imperial Forces, in view of expert knowledge of the internal structure of the Japanese Army. The first step was to be the abolition of the Imperial General Staff but the cautious retention of the Army and Navy Ministries which were Z of I agencies. (See Ch. II, p. 42.)
70 In his informal "Memoirs of Atsugi," General Arisue states : "I may say that through this all from the first to the final building of the runway, as long as I have been in the Army, I have never had to use my head and body for so long to such a great extent."
71 The communications unit established for this purpose actually was installed in the command plane in which Col Tench had arrived.
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